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Approved For Release 2001/08/15 : CIA-RDP61S00750A000100140248-0

IAC-D  
May 1954

**INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE**  
**CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE**  
**AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION**

1. Problems concerning the protection of sources and methods arising from the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information have, over a period of years, produced uncoordinated control mechanisms resulting in confusion and unnecessary overhead expense.

2. IAC representatives have refined a draft DCID 11/2 (Tab B) which, through standardization of control practices, is designed to reduce overhead expense and eliminate confusion by provision of a single written policy and procedure agreed by all concerned.

3. The most important consideration was the need to obtain maximum necessary use of intelligence while, with a minimum of administration, protecting sources and methods.

4. A brief staff study (Tab A) presents the problem, outlines present practices and the problems thereunder and recommends IAC approval of the draft DCID 11/2. Please telephone your concurrence or nonconcurrence to Mr. [REDACTED] Code 143, extension 766 by close of business on      May 1954.

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[REDACTED]  
Secretary

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**TAB A to**

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**May 1954**

## **CONTROL OF DISSEMINATION AND USE OF INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION**

### **PROBLEM:**

1. To clarify and standardize among the IAC agencies the various controls on dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information other than internal agency controls and special controls on special and atomic intelligence, information subject to copyright, libel, slander and communications laws, information which for moral, ethical or legal reasons must be protected, and unclassified material published for non-governmental use.

### **DISCUSSION:**

2. At present throughout the IAC community there are various control devices used in restricting the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information. Existing control devices include such stamps as "U. S. OFFICIALS ONLY" (used by State and CIA); "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS" (used by the Army, Navy, and Air Force); "LIMITED DISTRIBUTION" (used by CIA); "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" (as used by several agencies in the field); "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" (as used by the State Department in Washington); two stamps used by CIA/CS in controlling information, one for critical security reasons and the other for operational or administrative reasons; a limiting stamp or caveat used by [REDACTED] on another series of information which restricts the dissemination of that information to IAC components [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition there are restrictions in CIA regulations, applicable only within CIA, which govern the use of raw information in finished intelligence in order to protect sources and methods of intelligence. There also are bilateral agreements between components of CIA and other agencies which limit the use of information, for example: [REDACTED] has required the State Department, in writing, not to disseminate [REDACTED] reports overseas. Further, there have been efforts made in response to particular problems to educate recipients of intelligence and intelligence information on the controls which should be exercised and a temporary arrangement is in effect between

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this Agency and G-2 with respect to the certain uses which may be made by G-2 of this Agency's material.

3. The above description of the present system does not pretend to be an exhaustive explanation of existing practices but rather outlines the number of stamps and other mechanisms in existence to achieve control over the dissemination and use of intelligence and intelligence information. Several questions have arisen with respect to existing controls. Some of these questions are as follows:

a. Are the two stamps, one utilized by the three services and the other by State and CIA (**SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS and U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY**), designed to accomplish the same purpose?

b. Are part-time employees, external research personnel, consultants, aliens employed by the U.S. Government or foreign officers integrated into G-2 considered U.S. officials for the purpose of dissemination, under "U.S. OFFICIALS ONLY" or "SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS?"

c. Is it necessary and desirable to have two "FOR INFORMATION ONLY" stamps, one for use in the field and one for use in Washington, using the same words but designed for entirely different purposes?

d. Can material be released to non-IAC agencies which does not bear the caveat used at present by [REDACTED]

e. How is controlled information cited in finished intelligence?

f. Which information series require the deletion of source references and which do not when used in finished intelligence?

g. When controlled information is used in a finished intelligence product to what extent must that product be similarly controlled?

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**h. How does an analyst recognize information, the very substance of which should not be placed in finished intelligence products?**

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**4. After examining present practices and taking advantage of the experience of CIA collectors, producers and disseminators, a draft DCID 11/2 was developed to standardize control practices in the intelligence community. This draft was then subjected to further refinement by representatives of the IAC agencies.**

**RECOMMENDATION:**

**5. It is recommended that the IAC approve the draft DCID 11/2 (Tab B).**

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